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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Herman and Christine Wenzel appeal the summary judgment granted by the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey in favor of Nautilus Insurance 
Company on the Wenzels’ claim for coverage for a fire that damaged a motor home and 
trailer manufactured by K & C Conversions, Inc.  Because the District Court correctly 
determined that the insurance policy is clear and that it does not provide coverage for the 
loss, we will affirm. 
I. Background1 
The Wenzels placed an order for a motor home and trailer manufactured by K & C 
Conversions, Inc. (collectively with its president and chief officer, Charles Swensen, “K 
& C”).  The Wenzels took delivery in May of 2006 and immediately began to experience 
problems with the motor home and trailer due to defects, safety hazards, and substandard 
components.  A month after delivery, those problems resulted in the motor home 
spontaneously catching fire while the Wenzels were driving on the New Jersey Turnpike.  
The motor home and trailer, along with items inside the home and a race car attached to 
the trailer at the time of the fire, were damaged.  As a result of the fire, the Wenzels lost 
income because they were unable to participate in various car races across the country.   
The Wenzels brought suit against K & C in the Superior Court of New Jersey, 
Law Division, seeking damages resulting from the fire.  The parties settled the litigation 
in an agreement setting the sum of damages at $1,376,405.00.  K & C was insured 
                                              
1
 Because we are reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we recount the facts in 
the light most favorable to the non-movants, the Wenzels.  See Harrison Aire, Inc. v. 
Aerostar Int’l, Inc., 423 F.3d 374, 377 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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through a commercial general liability policy (the “Policy”) issued by Nautilus Insurance 
Company (“Nautilus”).  As a part of the settlement, K & C assigned to the Wenzels its 
right to collect the settlement amount from Nautilus.  The Wenzels, in turn, agreed not to 
pursue the settlement amount from K & C.   
Because Nautilus denied coverage, the Wenzels brought suit against it in the 
District Court, seeking to collect the settlement amount.  Nautilus filed a motion to 
dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for summary judgment 
pursuant to Rule 56, claiming that a Policy exclusion applied.   
The Policy broadly provides that Nautilus “will pay those sums that the insured 
becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property 
damage’ to which this insurance applies.”2  (App. at 114.)  The parties focused on three 
exclusions to coverage within the Policy – provisions 2(k), 2(l), and 2(j)(6).  Provision 
2(k) excludes from coverage “‘[p]roperty damage’ to ‘your [i.e., K & C’s] product’ 
arising out of it or any part of it … .”3  (App. at 117.)  Similarly, provision 2(l) excludes 
                                              
2
 “‘Bodily injury’ means bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by a person, 
including death resulting from any of these at any time.”  (App. at 123.)  “‘Property 
damage’ means: a. Physical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of use 
of that property.  All such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at the time of the physical 
injury that caused it; or b. Loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured.  
All such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at the time of the ‘occurrence’ that caused 
it.”  (App. at 126.) 
 
3
 The Policy’s references to “your” indicate the insured, K & C.  “‘Your product’ 
means: a. Any goods or products, other than real property, manufactured, sold, handled, 
distributed or disposed of by: (1) You; (2) Others trading under your name; or (3) A 
person or organization whose business or assets you have acquired; and b. Containers 
(other than vehicles), materials, parts or equipment furnished in connection with such 
goods or products.”  (App. at 126.) 
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“‘[p]roperty damage’ to ‘your work’ arising out of it or any part of it.” 4  (Id.)  Provision 
2(j)(6) excludes from coverage “any property that must be restored, repaired or replaced 
because ‘your work’ was incorrectly performed on it.”  (Id.)  The Policy provides for a 
limitation to exclusion 2(j)(6), however, indicating that it does not exclude “‘property 
damage’ included in the definition for ‘products-completed operations hazard’.”  (Id.)  
The products-completed operations hazard is, in turn, defined as “all ‘bodily injury’ and 
‘property damage’ occurring away from [K & C’s] premises … and arising out of ‘your 
product’ or ‘your work.’”  (App. at 125.) 
Nautilus argued that “the property damage for which [the Wenzels, standing in K 
& C’s shoes,] seek coverage is … the insured’s products and/or work,” (App. at 22) and 
that such damage is excluded under provisions 2(k) and 2(l).  The Wenzels conceded that 
they seek to recover for damage to the motor home and trailer, but argued that there was 
coverage under the products-completed operations hazard provision, which includes “all 
‘bodily injury’ and ‘property damage’ occurring away from [K & C’s] premises … and 
arising out of ‘your product’ or ‘your work.’”  (App. at 125.)  The products completed-
operations hazard provision, however, stands as a limitation to provision 2(j)(6), not an 
affirmative grant of coverage.  
The District Court granted Nautilus’s motion, entering summary judgment on the 
grounds that the Policy was clear and that it excluded coverage for business risks, that is: 
damage to K & C’s products due to defective workmanship.   
                                              
4
 “‘Your work’ means: a. Work or operations performed by you or on your behalf; 
and b. Materials, parts or equipment furnished in connection with such work or 
operations.”  (App. at 126.) 
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II. Discussion5 
The Wenzels continue to argue that the losses resulting from the fire should be 
covered under the products-completed operations hazard provision.  The Policy, 
excluding coverage for “‘[p]roperty damage’ to ‘your product’ arising out of it or any 
part of it,” (App. at 117) however, forecloses that argument.  A commercial general 
liability policy, such as the one issued by Nautilus in this case, is “not intended to serve 
as a performance bond or a guaranty of goods or services.”  Hartford Accident & Indem. 
Co. v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 861 F.2d 250, 253 (10th Cir. 1988).   
The Wenzels argue that the products-completed operations hazard limitation to 
exclusion 2(j)(6) abrogates provision 2(k) and allows for coverage.  The District Court 
correctly determined that such an argument is foreclosed, however, because, in New 
Jersey, a limitation to one exclusion of an insurance policy cannot restrict the scope of an 
entirely different exclusion.  See Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 405 A.2d 788, 795 (N.J. 
1979) (“Each exclusion is meant to be read with the insuring agreement, independently of 
every other exclusion.” (citation and alteration omitted)).   The products-completed 
operations hazard provision “when read with the two exclusions, does not provide 
coverage for faulty workmanship … .”  Am. Home Assurance Co. v. AGM Marine 
Contractors, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 2d 134, 137 (D. Mass. 2005).  Thus, because the 
                                              
5
 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of an order granting 
summary judgment is plenary.  Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 276 (3d Cir. 2002).  “A 
grant of summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party has established that 
there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.”  Hugh v. Butler Cnty. Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 266 (3d Cir. 
2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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Wenzels’ claim is for “property damage resulting from an ‘occurrence’ caused by the 
insured’s completed product or work,” (Appellants’ Opening Br. at 16), the District Court 
correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Nautilus.  
III. Conclusion 
For the forgoing reasons, we will affirm. 
